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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) is a public interest, law and
policy center with supporters in all 50 states. WLF regularly appears before
federal and state courts to promote economic liberty, free enterprise, and a limited
and accountable government. In particular, WLF routinely litigates in support of
efforts to ensure a strict separation of powers—both among the three branches of
the federal government and between federal and state governments—as a means of
preventing too much power from being concentrated within a single governmental
body.
The remaining amici are all members of Congress who believe strongly that
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds the bounds
of Congress’s constitutional authority by seeking to regulate Americans’ economic
inactivity—an individual’s decision not to purchase health insurance—which is far
afield from the enumerated powers assigned to the federal government under
Article I of the Constitution. Congressional amici include U.S. Rep. Michelle
Bachmann from Minnesota’s 6th congressional district; U.S. Rep. Dan Burton
from Indiana’s 5th congressional district; U.S. Rep. Mike Conaway from Texas’s

1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c), amici state that no
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part; and than no person or
entity, other than amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. All parties to this dispute
have consented to the filing of this brief.
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11th congressional district; U.S. Rep. Lynn Jenkins from Kansas’s 2nd
congressional district; U.S. Rep. Dan Lungren from California’s 3rd congressional
district; U.S. Rep. Tom McClintock from California’s 4th congressional district;
U.S. Rep. Gary Miller from California’s 42nd congressional district; U.S. Rep.
Ron Paul from Texas’s 14th congressional district; U.S. Rep. Ted Poe from
Texas’s 2nd congressional district; U.S. Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers from
Washington’s 5th congressional district; U.S. Rep. Jean Schmidt from Ohio’s 2nd
congressional district; and U.S. Rep. Todd Tiahrt from Kansas’s 4th congressional
district.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court’s dismissal of this action below was in error. As even the
district court acknowledged (Dkt. 28 at 15), Section 1501 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, which contains an individual mandate that seeks to
compel most Americans to purchase health insurance by 2014, goes well beyond
any previous exercise of federal authority. See §1501(b), 10106, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”). Because the district court’s order
upholding the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause amounts to a
declaration of virtually unlimited congressional power, it must be reversed. As
demonstrated below, even the broadest Supreme Court precedents interpreting the
limits of federal power do not give Congress the authority to force Americans to

2
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purchase a product they do not want.2
The “first principles” of the Constitution are that it “creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45). “As James Madison wrote: ‘The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite.’” Id. The federal government, Madison emphasized, is not granted
“an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 39.
These foundational principles are imperiled by the legislation upheld by the district
court below.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate “economic
activity” and “noneconomic activity” when controlling the latter is “an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (quoting Lopez). But nothing
in the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents gives Congress the power to force
private citizens to engage in economic transactions they would prefer to avoid.
If, as the district court contends (Dkt. 28 at 16), the Commerce power

2

This brief addresses only the defendants’ Commerce Clause and Tax
Clause arguments; WLF has analyzed elsewhere the Necessary and Proper Clause
issues raised by the individual mandate litigation. See Amicus Br. of Washington
Legal Foundation and Constitutional Law Scholars, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 2010 WL 3952344 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2010) at 25-30.
3
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extends to all “economic decisions” as well as all economic activities, Congress
would enjoy unlimited authority to mandate any behavior of any kind. After all,
any decision to do (or not to do) virtually anything inevitably has some economic
impact. Nor is there any special attribute of the health care market that makes
refusal to purchase health insurance more of an “economic activity” than any other
decision to refrain from purchasing any other product.
In addition, the Court’s precedents under the Tax Clause give Congress
broad authority to tax income and commercial transactions. But they do not give it
the power to use monetary fines to force people to purchase products they do not
want. Allowing Congress to use fines relabeled as taxes to regulate conduct that it
could not otherwise reach would effectively gut all remaining limits on federal
power. The federal government could use this authority to compel citizens to do
virtually anything. And even if the monetary penalty imposed by the individual
mandate is a tax, it is still unconstitutional because it does not fall under any of the
categories of taxes that Congress is authorized to impose.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY
CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court divides Congress’s Commerce
4
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Clause powers into three categories: (1) regulation of “the use of the channels of
interstate commerce”; (2) “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activities”; and (3) “regulat[ion] [of] . . .
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558-59; Morrison, 559 U.S. at 609.
The individual mandate clearly does not fall under either the first or second
of these categories. The decision not to purchase health insurance does not involve
“the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
Similarly, the mandate is not an example of “[r]egulat[ion] and protect[ion] [of] the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce.” Id. The status of being uninsured is neither an instrumentality of
interstate commerce, nor is it a person or thing that travels in interstate commerce.
The district court does not even suggest that the mandate can be upheld under
either of these categories.
The district court’s Commerce Clause holding instead hinges on the third
category—regulation of “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”
The fatal flaw in the district court’s reasoning is that none of the Supreme Court
precedents interpreting the Commerce Clause allow Congress to force ordinary
individuals to engage in commercial activity.

5
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A.

Existing Commerce Clause Precedents Do Not Give Congress The
Power To Regulate Mere Inactivity.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Commerce Clause

does not grant Congress unlimited power. “The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of
legislation.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (“Even
under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’
regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.”).
Even the broadest judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause do not
give Congress the power to regulate inactivity. Instead, they strictly limit
Congress’s authority to regulation of “economic activity” and noneconomic
activity whose restriction is necessary for the implementation of a regulatory
scheme aimed at controlling interstate commercial transactions.
1. Gonzales v. Raich.
The Supreme Court’s most expansive Commerce Clause precedent to date,
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), illustrates this point well. Raich was the
first and only case where the Court upheld the regulation of intrastate,
noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause. Raich ruled that Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce could justify a federal ban on the possession
of medical marijuana that had never been sold in any market or left the state where
it was grown. Id. Respondents Angel Raich and Diane Monson grew marijuana
6
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solely for personal consumption for medical purposes. Id. at 7. Despite the lack of
any direct involvement in commerce, the Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce
Clause gave Congress the power to forbid this activity. Both the defendants and
the district court below rely heavily on Raich. See Dkt. 28 at 12-13. Yet the
decision signally fails to justify the individual mandate.
Raich interprets Congress’s Commerce power expansively in three ways: by
allowing Congress broad authority to regulate “economic activity”; by permitting
regulation of noneconomic activity as part of a broader regulatory scheme aimed at
interstate commercial activity; and, by applying a “rational basis” test. But none of
these three features of Raich provide support for the argument that the Commerce
Clause authorizes congressional regulation of inactivity—an individual’s decision
not to engage in commercial activity.
a. The individual mandate does not regulate “economic activity.”
The Raich Court reaffirmed that Congress has the power to regulate
“economic activity.” It adopted a broad definition of “economics,” which “refers to
‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’” Raich, 545 U.S.
at 25-26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720
(1966)). Expansive as this definition may be, an individual’s mere status of being
uninsured does not qualify. Choosing not to purchase health insurance involves
neither production, nor distribution, nor consumption of commodities. Indeed, an

7
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individual who chooses not to purchase insurance has chosen not to consume or
distribute the commodity in question. Obviously, he or she is also not “producing”
any commodity by refusing to purchase insurance. By contrast, the Raich
defendants were engaged in “economic activity” since they were both producing
and consuming marijuana. Id. at 7, 25-26.
b. The individual mandate cannot be upheld as a regulation of
noneconomic activity necessary to implement a broader
regulatory scheme.
Like Lopez and Morrison before it, Raich indicates that “Congress may
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 37; see also Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. But as all three cases demonstrate, this
power applies only to the regulation of “noneconomic activity.” Id. It does not
cover regulation of inactivity or the refusal to engage in economic transactions.
Angel Raich and Diane Monsen had not been inactive or merely refused to engage
in some transaction. To the contrary, they were actively involved in the production
and consumption of homegrown medical marijuana.
If Raich were interpreted so broadly as to permit regulation of mere
inactivity, Congress would have the power to compel any citizen to help enforce its
regulatory schemes. It could force individuals to purchase General Motors cars in
order to assist the struggling auto industry, or purchase financial products from

8
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banks that received federal bailout funds. By the same token, Congress could
require individuals to purchase products from any industry with political clout.
Similarly, it could require individuals to purchase memberships in exercise clubs in
order to increase their physical fitness, which in turn would increase their
economic productivity and stimulate interstate commerce. See John H. Kerr
& Marjolein C. H. Vos, Employee Fitness Programmes, Absenteeism, and General
Well-Being, 7 WORK & STRESS 179 (1993) (providing evidence that employee
physical fitness reduces absenteeism and increases productivity).
In sum, there is no limit to the regulatory authority Congress could claim
under the district court’s sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The
federal government would have the power to force citizens to engage in any
activity that might conceivably affect commerce in some way. This is precisely
the kind of unconstrained police power that the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (noting that “the police power” is “denied
the National Government and reposed in the States”).
c. Raich’s rational basis test does not apply to this case.
Raich applied the deferential “rational basis” test to the government’s
claims, ruling that “[w]e need not determine whether [defendants’] activities, taken
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. The defendants

9
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claimed below that the rational basis test should be applied in the present case as
well. See Dkt. 12 at 19.
But the Raich Court nowhere indicated that the rational basis test is
applicable in a case where the government seeks to regulate inactivity, as opposed
to some sort of positive action. Rather, the Court explicitly noted that the test
applied to the government’s regulation of Raich and Monsen’s “activities, taken in
the aggregate.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
The defendants appear to assume that Congress’s mere assertion of
Commerce Clause authority is enough to trigger application of the rational basis
test. But neither Raich nor any previous Supreme Court precedent states any such
thing. To the contrary, Raich applied the standard only to a regulation of
“activity.”
Lopez and Morrison did not apply the deferential rational basis test, despite
the government’s invocation of the Commerce Clause. In Morrison, the Court
struck down the challenged section of the Violence Against Women Act despite
the fact that the claim of a substantial impact on interstate commerce was
“supported by numerous [congressional] findings” that would almost certainly
have been more than enough to pass muster under the rational basis approach.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. Although Morrison did not explicitly reject the rational
basis test, the Court’s failure to apply the test and its imposition of a considerably

10
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higher standard of scrutiny strongly suggests that, at the very least, rational basis
analysis does not apply to regulations of intrastate noneconomic activity such as
gun possession in a school zone (the regulated activity in Lopez) or sexual violence
(Morrison).
Indeed, both Lopez and Morrison emphasized that “‘simply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” Lopez, 514 U.S., at 557 (quoting
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311
(1981)) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at
614 (quoting identical language from Lopez). Had the Lopez and Morrison Courts
applied the rational basis test, these decisions would inevitably have gone the other
way. In Morrison, Congress had compiled extensive evidence of possible effects
of gender-based violence on interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. In
Lopez, Justice Breyer’s dissent indicated a variety of ways in which a rational basis
existed for believing that gun possession in school zones might have such effects.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer pointed out,
if we “ask whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a
significant (or substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and
interstate commerce . . . the answer to this question must be yes.” Id. at 618. If
the rational basis test does not apply to regulation of noneconomic intrastate

11
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activity (as in Lopez and Morrison), it surely cannot apply to attempts to reach
mere inactivity.
2.

Other Commerce Clause precedents do not support the district
court’s position.

Pre-Raich Supreme Court Commerce Clause precedent provides even less
support than Raich for the district court’s decision. As the Court pointed out five
years before Raich in Morrison, “in every case” where the Court has “sustained
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects
on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic
endeavor” and had a “commercial character.” 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), a case relied on by the district
court (Dkt. 28 at 13), was one of the Supreme Court’s broadest interpretations of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Yet its facts differ radically
from those of the present case. Wickard upheld the application of the 1938
Agricultural Adjustment Act’s restrictions on wheat production as applied to
Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer who produced wheat for consumption on his own
farm. 317 U.S. at 115, 121-27. The Court noted that restriction of home-grown,
home-consumed wheat was a necessary component of Congress’s scheme to “raise
the market price of wheat” because in the absence of regulation, home-grown
wheat could serve as a substitute for wheat sold in the market and depress demand
for the latter. Id. at 127-29.
12
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Unlike the instant case, Wickard addressed a regulation of clearly economic
activity. Roscoe Filburn sold “a portion of [his wheat] crop” on the market and
“fe[d] part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold.” Id. at 114.
Filburn’s wheat production was unquestionably part of a commercial enterprise
that sold goods in interstate commerce. As the Court noted in Lopez, Wickard
“involved economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone
does not.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Until Raich, all of the Court’s other post-New Deal decisions sustaining
exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause addressed
regulations of economic activity involving the sale or production of goods or
services.3 Unlike the individual mandate, these laws clearly regulated preexisting
commercial activity.
Nor is the individual mandate analogous to those cases upholding civil
rights statutes that ban racial discrimination by motels and restaurants. See
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding regulation of
discrimination against customers of a commercial restaurant); Heart of Atlanta

3

See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-280 (upholding regulation of commercial
mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding regulation of
commercial loan sharking); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110
(1942) (upholding regulation of price of milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act regulation of employment
conditions); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding
National Labor Relations Act regulation of employment relations).
13
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Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding federal ban on
discrimination against customers of a hotel serving interstate travelers). Such
federal antidiscrimination laws apply only to preexisting businesses engaged in
commercial activity in a regulated industry. By contrast, uninsured individuals are,
by definition, not participating in the insurance business. Thus, the individual
mandate is actually analogous to a statute that requires individuals to patronize a
restaurant or hotel even if they had no previous intention of doing so. See Ilya
Somin, The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and the Constitutional Text,
ENGAGE, Vol. 11, No. 1, Mar. 2010, at 49.
B.

The Status of Being Uninsured Is Not An Economic Activity.
The district court attempts to circumvent the constitutional bar on

Commerce Clause regulation of inactivity by claiming that the state of being
uninsured qualifies as activity under Supreme Court precedent. The argument
comes in two forms: a broad version claiming that any “economic decision” can be
regulated under the Commerce Clause, and a narrow one focusing on supposedly
unique characteristics of the health care market. Both versions fail for similar
reasons: they end up giving Congress unconstrained power to mandate virtually
anything, something the Supreme Court has repeatedly said is impermissible.

14
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1. “Economic decisions” are not economic activities.
The broad version of the district court’s argument claims that any decision
with economic effects qualifies as an economic activity. The district court asserts
that the Commerce Clause “reaches” not merely “economic activity,” but
“economic decisions.” Dkt. 28 at 16. A recent decision by the Western District of
Virginia similarly concludes that “decisions to pay for health care without
insurance are economic activities . . . . Because of the nature of supply and
demand, plaintiffs’ choices directly affect the price of insurance in the market,
which Congress set out in the Act to control.” Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2010
WL 4860299, at *15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).
The flaw in this argument is obvious. The “nature of supply and demand”
means that any decision to do or not do anything will directly affect the price of
some good or service. If someone chooses not to purchase a car, that will affect
the price of cars. If a person chooses to sleep for an hour rather than work, he will
earn less money, which in turn means that he will engage in less consumer
spending or investment, which will affect the prices of various goods. By this
reasoning, Congress could not only force people to purchase any product of any
kind, it could force them to engage in just about any other kind of activity that
affects the price of some good or service that Congress sets out to control.

15

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110824062 Filed: 12/22/2010 Page: 24

The district court’s “economic decisions” doctrine also contravenes Supreme
Court precedent. Under its approach, Lopez would have been decided the other
way. Carrying a gun into a school zone—the action forbidden by the Gun Free
School Zones Act invalidated in that case—is clearly an “economic decision”
under the district court’s reasoning. In the aggregate, such actions surely have an
effect on prices in various markets, including the market for guns and the market
for illegal drugs in schools. Indeed, Alfonso Lopez was paid $40 to carry his gun
in a school zone for the purpose of transferring it to a member of a drug gang who
probably intended to use it to defend the group’s commercial interests in a “gang
war.” United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
2. No unique feature of the health insurance market transforms being
uninsured into economic activity.
In addition to concluding that Congress can regulate any “economic
decision,” the district court also holds that the individual mandate regulates an
activity because of the special nature of the health care market: “[t]he health care
market is unlike other markets. No one can guarantee his or her health, or ensure
that he or she will never participate in the health care market. Indeed, the opposite
is nearly always true.” Dkt. 28 at 16. For this reason, it concludes, “[t]he plaintiffs
have not opted out of the health care services market because, as living, breathing
beings, who do not oppose medical services on religious grounds, they cannot opt
16
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out of this market.” Id. Since everyone participates in the health care market, the
district court reasons, choosing not to buy health insurance does not qualify as
inactivity. It is “an economic decision to try to pay for health care services later”
in some other way. Id.
In reality, it is simply not true that everyone purchases health care. Some
people rely on charity or home remedies, while others never get sick enough to
require medical treatment before they die. Still, it may well be true that the
overwhelming majority of people participate in the health care market in
some way. But this does not differentiate health care from virtually any other
market.
If the relevant “market” is defined broadly enough, one can characterize any
decision not to purchase a good or service exactly the same way. The district court
does not claim that everyone will inevitably use health insurance. Instead, it
defines the relevant market as “health care.” Id. (emphasis added). The same
sleight of hand works for virtually any other mandate Congress might care to
impose. As the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently put it,
“the same reasoning could apply to transportation, housing, or nutritional
decisions. This broad definition of the economic activity subject to congressional
regulation lacks logical limitation and is unsupported by [the Supreme Court’s]
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 2010
WL 5059718, at *12 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010).
Consider the case of a mandate requiring everyone to purchase General
Motors cars in order to help the auto industry. There are many people who do not
participate in the market for cars. But just about everyone participates in the
market for “transportation.” In the words of the district court, “[n]o one can
guarantee . . . [that he] will never participate in the [transportation] market.” Dkt.
28 at 16. We all move from place to place in some way.
The same logic can be used to justify virtually any other mandate Congress
might care to impose—even a mandate requiring everyone to see the most recent
Harry Potter movie. After all, just about everyone participates in the market for
entertainment. Choosing not to go to the movies is just “an economic decision to
try to pay for [other entertainment] services later.” Id.
Health insurance is undoubtedly an important good. But it has no unique
characteristics that transform failure to purchase it into an “economic activity.”
II.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE
TAX CLAUSE.
The Tax Clause of the Constitution gives Congress “the Power To lay and

collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1. This Clause does not authorize the individual mandate for two reasons.
18
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First, the mandate is not a tax but a penalty intended to force compliance with a
regulation. Second, even it if were a tax, it is not one of the several types of taxes
authorized by the Constitution. As with the defendants’ effort to advance a
comparably unlimited construction of the Commerce Clause (see supra, §§ I.A-B),
their interpretation of the Tax Clause would give Congress virtually unlimited
police power.
A.

The Individual Mandate Is A Regulatory Penalty, Not A Tax.
1. The mandate fits the Supreme Court’s definition of a “penalty.”
Supreme Court precedent distinguishes between a tax defined as a revenue-

raising measure and a monetary penalty designed to regulate behavior. Under the
Court’s approach, “‘[a] tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property
for the purpose of supporting the Government.’” United States v. Reorganized
CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) (quoting New Jersey v.
Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906), and United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510,
515 (1942)). By contrast, “a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by statute as
punishment for an unlawful act.” United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572
(1931).
Of course, “if an exaction [is] clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a
tax simply by calling it such.” Id. Simply put, the government cannot redefine a
penalty as a tax through clever labeling. As the Supreme Court explains, “[n]o
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mere exercise of the art of lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a
thing” since “if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by
the simple expedient of calling it such.” Id.; see also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (holding that “there comes a time in the extension of
the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment”);
Dep’t. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (same).
In Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, the Supreme Court explained
that “if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an
unlawful act or omission.” 518 U.S. at 225. Although Reorganized CF&I was a
case interpreting the federal bankruptcy statute, it relied on Tax Clause precedent
in reaching its decision, and made no legal distinction between the two contexts.
See id. at 224-25 (relying on Tax Clause precedent such as United States v. La
Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931)).
Reorganized CF&I addressed a federal statute “requiring pension plan
sponsors to fund potential plan liability according to a complex statutory formula
. . . [and] employers who maintain a pension plan to pay the Government 10
percent of any accumulated funding deficiency.” Id. The court noted that “[i]f the
employer fails to correct the deficiency . . . , the employer is obligated to pay an
additional ‘tax’ of 100 percent of the accumulated funding deficiency.” Id.

20

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110824062 Filed: 12/22/2010 Page: 29

Despite the fact that the government described this framework as a “tax,” the Court
ruled that it was in fact a penalty because it constituted a “punishment for an
unlawful omission.” Id. at 224. The omission in question was the employer’s
failure to adequately fund its pension plan, and the “penalty” was a fine equal to
100% of the accumulated deficiency. Id. (interpreting 26 U.S.C. §§ 4971(a-b),
4982).
The individual mandate is very similar in structure to the statute addressed
by the Court in Reorganized CF&I. Like the latter, Section 1501 of the PPACA
creates a “punishment for an unlawful act or omission.” Id. at 225. The text of the
Act itself defines the fine imposed on those who fail to obey the individual
mandate “a penalty with respect to the individual” who fails to obey the
requirement that he or she purchase health insurance. See PPACA § 1501(b).
Nor does the fact that the penalty is included in the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) and collected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), see Dkt. 12 at 28, make
it a tax. If it did, Congress would have unlimited power to use fines to mandate
anything so long as the fine in question was incorporated into the IRC and
collected by the IRS. Fines included in the IRC and collected by the IRS have
been declared regulatory penalties by the Supreme Court before. See, e.g.,
Reorganized CF&I, 518 U.S. at 216-26 (declaring that a fine incorporated into the
IRC and collected by the IRS is a regulatory penalty rather than a tax).
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For these reasons, all three of the district court decisions to have considered
the issue have ruled that the individual mandate is a regulatory penalty rather than
a tax. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 2010 WL 5059718, at *19 (concluding that
the mandate “is, in form and substance, a penalty as opposed to a tax”); Liberty
Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *10 (“I conclude that the better
characterization of the exactions imposed under the Act for violations of the
employer and individual coverage provisions is that of regulatory penalties, not
taxes.”); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 716
F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1140 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (holding “that Congress imposed a
penalty and not a tax”).
2. This court need not inquire into Congress’s “hidden motives” in
order to conclude that the mandate is a penalty.
It is true that “[i]nquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress
to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of
courts.” Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937). Courts should
“not undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a
tax, to ascribe to Congress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise
another power denied by the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 514. In this case,
however, there is no need for any “collateral” research or “inquiry into hidden
motives.” The penal nature of the statute is evident from its face, since it is
described as a “penalty” in the statutory text itself.
22
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Far from hiding their purposes, the supporters of the PPACA repeatedly and
publicly emphasized that the statute was not a tax, but only a regulatory measure
designed to compel individuals to purchase health insurance. For example,
President Barack Obama stated publicly in September 2009 that “for us to say that
you’ve got to take a responsibility to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax
increase.” Somin, Individual Health Insurance Mandate, supra at 50; see also
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 2010 WL 5059718, at *18 (citing statements by
Congress, and noting “the unequivocal denials by the Executive and Legislative
branches that the ACA was a tax”); Florida ex rel. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at
1132-40 (reaching the same conclusion after review of the text and legislative
history). Only after PPACA was enacted by Congress and legal challenges to the
individual mandate arose, did the government adopt the novel argument that the
individual mandate is a tax.
Even if the plaintiffs are precluded from relying on evidence of “hidden
motives” to prove that the individual mandate is not a tax, Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at
513-14, “[t]he holding of Sonzinsky cuts both ways and applying that holding to
the facts here, [courts] have no choice but to find that the [individual mandate]
penalty is not a tax.” Florida ex rel. McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. The
Supreme Court has never allowed the government to cite “hidden motives” after
the fact to prove that what the statute unambiguously describes as a penalty is
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actually a tax after all. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the
Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, NYU J.L. & LIBERTY
(forthcoming), at 24, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1680392.
3. The mandate is not a tax merely because it might raise some revenue
for the federal government.
The defendants contend that the individual mandate should be considered a
tax merely because it may end up raising some revenue for the federal government.
See Dkt. 12 at 28-29. If adopted by the courts, this position would negate all
restraints on Congress’s taxing power and completely eliminate the longstanding
distinction between a tax and a regulatory penalty. Any penalty enforced by a fine
is likely to raise at least some revenue, so long as even one violator is forced to pay
the fine.
Under this approach, Congress would have the power to use monetary
penalties to compel citizens to engage in whatever activities it might desire. For
example, it could use the threat of fines to force citizens to purchase General
Motors cars in order to assist the auto industry. It could use also use fines to force
individuals to exercise every day in order to increase their health and economic
productivity. The greater the fine and the resulting degree of compulsion, the
greater the potential revenue that might be generated. In this way, the more
coercive and punitive Congress’s penal fines become, the more likely they are to
qualify as “taxes” under the defendants’ interpretation of the Tax Clause.
24
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But none of the precedents cited by the defendants compels any such result.
For example, United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), rev’d in part on other
grounds, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), nowhere concludes or
even suggests that the mere fact that a penalty might generate revenue
automatically makes it a tax. To the contrary, it reiterates the principle that
“[p]enalty provisions in tax statutes added for breach of a regulation concerning
activities in themselves subject only to state regulation have caused this Court to
declare the enactments invalid.” Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31. It is true that the Court
recognized that “a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
discourages or deters the activities taxed.” Id. at 28. But the validity of the tax in
question turned not only on the fact that it generated revenue but that it was an
“excise tax” on a commercial transaction—gambling wagers. Id. at 23. Excise
taxes are specifically authorized as an independent category of congressional
taxing authority in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. By contrast,
there is no preexisting commercial activity for the government to tax in the present
case.
Similarly, Sonzinsky v. United States reaffirmed the rule that courts must
strike down a “statute [that] contains regulatory provisions related to a purported
tax in such a way . . . that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing
the regulations.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514. Sonzinsky also ruled that the courts
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must uphold a statute that “[o]n its face . . . is only a taxing measure” without
considering Congress’s “hidden motives.” Id. at 513-14. In the present case, the
statute “on its face” is a penalty and the penal motive is anything but hidden.
4. Congress may use non-tax financial penalties to enforce its other
enumerated powers, but not to regulate activities that it cannot
otherwise reach.
Congress may use financial penalties that do not qualify as taxes in order to
enforce its other enumerated powers, such as those provided by the Commerce
Clause. “Congress may impose penalties in aid of the exercise of any of its
enumerated powers.” Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393
(1940). But it may not use such penalties to regulate behavior that it cannot
otherwise reach. If it could, Congress would enjoy essentially unlimited authority.
It could then use the threat of monetary penalties to compel individuals to do
virtually anything. See supra § II.A.3.
As the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently recognized
in refusing to dismiss another case challenging the individual mandate, “the power
of Congress to exact a penalty is more constrained than its taxing authority under
the General Welfare Clause—it must be in aid of an enumerated power.” Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (E.D. Va. 2010).
B.

Even If It Is A Tax, The Individual Mandate Is Not A Tax Authorized
By The Constitution.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact several types of taxes.
26
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Excise taxes, duties, and imposts are authorized by the Tax Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Income taxes are authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. All direct taxes must be apportioned among the
states in proportion to population. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§, 2, 9.
No one claims that the individual mandate is a duty or an impost. If it is to
be constitutional, therefore, the individual mandate must be either an excise tax, an
income tax, or a direct tax apportioned among the states. It is none of these.
1. The mandate is not an income tax.
The Supreme Court has stated that it is “essential to distinguish between
what is and what is not ‘income,’ as the term is there used, and to apply the
distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to
form.” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920). In Comm’r of Internal
Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., the leading case interpreting the definition of
“income” under the Sixteenth Amendment, the Court defined income as
encompassing “accessions to wealth, clearly realized and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.” 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
The individual mandate does not qualify as an income tax because it does
not target any “gain” or “accession to wealth” realized by individuals from their
labor, property, or indeed any other source. It “does not appear to tax income
[because it] refers to no gains, receipts, accruals, or accessions to wealth, other
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than to an arguably unimportant algebraic function of income for some taxpayers.”
Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128
TAX NOTES 169, 187 (2010).
It is true that the mandate exempts individuals with income below the
federal poverty line, and reduces the size of the penalty imposed on other lowerincome taxpayers. See PPACA § 1501, §§ 5000(A)(d-e). But the mere fact that
there are income-based exemptions does not suggest that the tax targets income as
such. Otherwise, the government could convert virtually any regulatory penalty
into an income tax simply by exempting low-income citizens (or for that matter
high-income ones). See Willis & Chung, Constitutional Decapitation, supra at
190-93.
2. The mandate is not an excise tax.
If the mandate is not an income tax, it is even more clearly not an excise tax.
Excise taxes “apply to activities, transactions, or the use of property. They do not
apply to nothing—that is, they do not apply directly to individuals for being
individuals or on land.” Id. at 182. This is the definition adopted by standard
reference works in both law and finance. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
defined an indirect tax (of which excise taxes are a subset) as a “tax laid upon the
happening of an event, as distinguished from its tangible fruits.” Tyler v. United
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States, 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930).4
The penalty established by the individual mandate is not triggered by any
activity, transaction, or event. It therefore cannot be an excise tax.
3.

If the mandate is neither an income nor an excise tax, it is either
an unconstitutional direct tax, or no tax at all.

If the individual mandate does not qualify as an income tax, excise tax, duty
or impost, it must, by process of elimination, be a direct tax—assuming that it is a
tax at all. Direct taxes, however, must be apportioned among the states in
proportion to their population. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The individual mandate
undeniably fails this requirement. If the mandate qualifies as a tax, it is therefore
an unconstitutional direct tax.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that the Court reverse
the judgment below.

4

Some jurists suggest that an excise tax may target the possession of
property rather than its use. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796)
(upholding a tax on possession of carriages, without resolving whether such a tax
is an excise or a duty). But even if a tax on possession qualifies as an excise, the
fine imposed by the individual mandate fails to target the possession of any
property.
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